Employers’ Use of Health Insurance Exchanges: Lessons from Massachusetts by Hall, Mark A.
Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy 
Volume 6 
Issue 2 Health Reform: The Act, Decision and 
Election 
Article 9 
2013 
Employers’ Use of Health Insurance Exchanges: Lessons from 
Massachusetts 
Mark A. Hall 
Wake Forest University, mhall@wakehealth.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark A. Hall, Employers’ Use of Health Insurance Exchanges: Lessons from Massachusetts, 6 St. Louis U. 
J. Health L. & Pol'y (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol6/iss2/9 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship 
Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
355 
EMPLOYERS’ USE OF HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: 
LESSONS FROM MASSACHUSETTS 
MARK A. HALL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
The small-group employer market is a core concern of both federal and 
Massachusetts’ health insurance reforms. Both reform laws require the 
governmental insurance exchange to include a component specifically for 
small firms.1 There are good reasons for this effort to improve the small-
group market. Millions of the 40 million Americans who work for small 
businesses are uninsured.2 Whereas almost all employers with 200 or more 
employees offer their employees health insurance, only about half of 
employers with fewer than ten employees do so.3 A substantially greater 
portion of small-group premiums go to cover overhead (profits, 
administration, sales costs) than for large-group insurance, and small-group 
insurance tends to have higher cost-sharing obligations for patients.4 Also, 
most small firms with insurance select only a single plan, whereas larger 
firms usually give workers a choice of coverage options.5 
Small-group insurance exchanges are meant to address these several 
problems. By standardizing and streamlining benefits, they aim to make it 
easier for employers or their agents to find affordable insurance. A 
government clearinghouse for private insurance also seeks to reduce 
 
* Fred and Elizabeth Turnage Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. This research was 
funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s program on Changes in Health Care 
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 1. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM: SIX YEARS LATER 9 (2012), 
available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8311.pdf [hereinafter KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND.]. 
 2. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: 
Analysis of the March 2008 Current Population Survey, ISSUE BRIEF (Emp. Benefit Research 
Inst.), Sep. 2008, at 3, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09a-2008.pdf. 
 3. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & ED. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 
ANNUAL SURVEY 36 (2012), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8345.pdf. 
 4. Id. at 107. 
 5. Id. at 60. 
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administrative and sales costs, and to focus choice on the insurers that offer 
the best value. Finally, exchanges are a mechanism by which small 
employers might feasibly offer health insurance in a fashion that enables 
workers to choose from a wide array of insurers and plan options. 
Despite these promises, most private or government health insurance 
exchanges so far have failed to gain substantial market share. To date, this 
track record holds true in Massachusetts. Its exchange, called the Health 
Connector, has had notable success in expanding coverage for individuals, 
but so far it has not made major in-roads into the employer-based insurance 
market.6 Although Massachusetts employers support reform and have 
maintained or even increased their willingness to offer insurance, the 
Connector launched its small group program late in the reform process and 
few employers have elected to purchase through the Connector.7 Of 
40,000 people who purchase private insurance through the Connector, only 
about ten percent do so as part of employer coverage, and almost all of 
these employers are “micro-sized” (five or fewer), with an average of only 
about 1.5 employees per group policy.8 This employee enrollment 
constitutes less than one percent of small-group employee coverage 
statewide.9 
Federal insurance reform is modeled substantially on the successful 
reforms in Massachusetts, including its version of a health insurance 
exchange.10 To learn from both the successes and limitations of 
Massachusetts’ reforms, this study investigates employers’ use of the 
Connector, in order to inform states and the federal government about best 
strategies for design and operation of their new small-group health 
insurance exchanges and market regulations. Prior research on the 
Connector has focused mainly on its role in enrolling individuals who, with 
or without subsidies, purchase non-group coverage.11 Much less attention 
 
 6. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 1, at 4. 
 7. MASS. HEALTH CONNECTOR, REPORT TO THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 14-15 (2010). 
 8. SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., GEO.UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INST., THE MASSACHUSETTS AND 
UTAH HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: LESSONS LEARNED 6, 8 (2012), available at http://ihcrp. 
georgetown.edu/pdfs/Mass%20Utah%20Exchanges%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf. 
 9. See COMM. OF MASS. DIV. OF INS., 2011 MEMBERSHIP REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
INDIVIDUAL/SMALL EMPLOYER MARKETS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE (2012), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/docs/doi/companies/fin-reports/memsumrep08.pdf (reporting 
that in 2011, about 635,000 people were enrolled in the state’s small group market). 
 10. SHARON LONG ET AL., STATE HEALTH ACCESS REFORM EVALUATION, NATIONAL REFORM: 
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM EVALUATIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS? (2011), available at 
http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/publications/MassachusettsNationalLessonsBrief.pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., AMY LISCHKO, PIONEER INSTITUTE PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, FIXING THE 
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH EXCHANGE 1 (2011), available at http://pioneerinstitute.org/down 
load/fixing-the-massachusetts-health-exchange/. 
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has been paid to Massachusetts employers’ use of the Connector — a gap 
this study was designed to fill. 
The reasons for low employer use of the Massachusetts Connector so far 
merits close attention. The role of employers is important to the potential 
success of the new health insurance exchanges. Employer participation will 
help exchanges achieve economies of scale and market penetration that will 
allow them to reduce costs and impose competitive discipline on the rest of 
the market. Also, if employer use of exchanges is not broad-based, then 
exchanges might become targets for adverse selection.12 Although each 
state’s market structure is distinct, and some trial-and-error is unavoidable, it 
can be helpful to know more about what has and has not worked so far in 
Massachusetts to attract employer participation, and why. 
B. Methodology 
This is a qualitative investigation consisting of document review and in-
depth interviews. Document review focused on reports, studies, data and 
other information sources that relate to employers’ use of the Massachusetts 
Connector, such as the Connector’s quarterly and annual reports, 
presentations and minutes from meetings of the Connector’s governing 
board, market reports and surveys from the Massachusetts Divisions of 
Insurance and of Healthcare Finance and Policy, and analyses of the 
Connector written by others who have studied it, including some who 
previously worked with the Connector. 
Interviews were conducted by the author, in person or by phone, with 37 
key informants identified from public sources and through a “snowball” 
fashion in which initial sources recommended sources from similar or 
different perspectives. These interviews included 11 current and former 
Connector officials, board members, and other government officials; 15 
independent insurance brokers (also known as agents) or employee benefits 
advisors, 4 people with employer industry and trade groups, and 8 people 
with 4 insurers in the market, including the 3 largest plans in the market. 
Interviews with insurance brokers included four who have served on the 
Connector’s advisory board, and two who have sold some insurance 
through the Connector. 
These interviews inquired about: the advantages and disadvantages of 
the Connector for employers, whether insurance should be selected by 
employers or employees, how billing arrangements work for employee-
selected coverage, the role of insurance brokers within the Connector, 
 
 12. TIMOTHY S. JOST, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: EIGHT DIFFICULT ISSUES 8 (2010), available at http://www.common 
wealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Sep/1444_Jost_hlt_ins_ex
changes_ACA_eight_difficult_issues_v2.pdf. 
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product design inside and outside the Connector, pricing differences 
between the Connector and the outside market, any adverse selection issues 
relating to employers’ use of the exchange, and various techniques that 
have worked and not worked for increasing employer participation. As 
discussed below, interviews also probed whether these views and 
experiences are expected to translate to the new Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
exchange structures in other states, or whether they are unique to the 
particular features of Massachusetts’ reform law or market conditions. 
Interviews were semi-structured, following an interview guide developed 
in consultation with the project’s consulting advisors. Detailed interview 
notes were coded using specialized computer software, and were analyzed, 
along with documentary materials, using standard qualitative methods,13 
which include triangulation (seeking to confirm or disconfirm points from 
various perspectives and information sources). 
II.  FINDINGS 
A. Basic Structure and History 
The Massachusetts Connector divides its operations between subsidized 
insurance for the low-income population, known as Commonwealth Care 
(or CommCare), and private, unsubsidized insurance, called 
Commonwealth Choice (or CommChoice).14 Eight insurers participate in 
CommChoice, including all of the major companies in the commercial 
market (Blue Cross, Harvard Pilgrim, Tufts, and Fallon), along with several 
smaller plans and more recent market entrants (Neighborhood Health Plan, 
Celticare, Health Net, and Health New England).15 
Massachusetts has merged its individual and small group markets for 
most rating and regulatory purposes, but the Connector markets its 
coverage separately to small groups and individuals.16 Overall, the 
Connector’s private (unsubsidized) insurance enrollment is dominated by 
individually-purchased insurance, which accounts for 38,365 people or 
89% percent of the 43,119 people in CommChoice, as of December 
 
 13. See Bryan J. Weiner et al., Use of Qualitative Methods in Published Health Services 
and Management Research: A 10-Year Review, 68 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 6 (2011); see also 
Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., Qualitative Data Analysis for Health Services Research: Developing 
Taxonomy, Themes, and Theory, 42 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1758 (2007). 
 14. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 8, at 4. 
 15. Health Reform Facts and Figures, MASS. HEALTH CONNECTOR (2012), [hereinafter 
Facts and Figures]. 
 16. TERRY GARDINER & ISABEL PERERA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SHOPPING AROUND: SETTING 
UP STATE HEALTH CARE EXCHANGES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 43 (2011), available at http://health 
reformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/shop_exchange.pdf. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] EMPLOYERS’ USE OF HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 359 
2012.17 The Connector’s employer enrollment accounts for less than 1% of 
small-firm coverage statewide.18 
The Connector first made individual (nongroup) CommChoice 
enrollment available in 2007, but it did not offer small-group employer 
plans until 2009, and then only on a limited basis.19 The Connector’s small-
group program has had two distinct phases. The first, called the 
“Contributory Plan,” was designed to pilot an approach that allowed 
individual employees to choose their own insurer.20 Participating employers 
selected a reference plan that determined their contribution, and employees 
were then free to select alternative insurers and benefit options within the 
same tier of benefits the employer selected.21 After not quite a year, the 
Connector ended the pilot, having enrolled a maximum of only 77 
employers and 207 workers.22 
The Connector then revamped its small-employer program, which it 
relaunched in early 2010 under the name Business Express.23 Mirroring the 
market’s conventional purchasing model, Business Express requires all 
participating employees to join the single plan that the employer selects.24 A 
principal reason for this change, explained in more detail below, was 
(according to several well-placed sources) the desire to transfer a block of 
business that was already enrolled with the Connector’s third-party 
administrator (TPA), the Small Business Service Bureau (SBSB).25 This TPA is 
also a trade association that, for several decades, has marketed health and 
other insurance products, and the two parties (SBSB and the Connector) 
decided that it was mutually advantageous for SBSB to consolidate its small-
group health insurance operations through the Connector.26 
 
 17. COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, MONTHLY HEALTH CONNECTOR SUMMARY REPORT 1 
(Dec. 2012). 
 18. See COMM. OF MASS. DIV. OF INS., supra note 9. 
 19. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, STATES IN ACTION ARCHIVE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH 
CONNECTOR (2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/States-in-
Action/2011/Mar/February-March-2011/Snapshots/Massachusetts.aspx. 
 20. GARDINER & PERERA, supra note 16, at 42. 
 21. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. 
 22. COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, CONNECTOR QUARTERLY PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 5 
(Oct. 2010) [hereinafter CONNECTOR QUARTERLY PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 2010]. 
 23. CHERYL IERNA, COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, CONTRIBUTORY PLAN UPDATE 4 (2009). 
 24. GARDINER & PERERA, supra note 16, at 42. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. Initially, SBSB and the Connector had agreed to transfer 17,000 subscribers in two 
stages. The first stage involved moving the 1200-1600 subscribers (exact numbers vary) 
whose policies already matched what the Connector offered, and the second stage was to 
have moved the remaining 15,000 or so for whom either new coverage packages would need 
to be developed, or those who would need to select different coverage. This second, much 
larger transfer never occurred, however. The exact reasons remain murky. By the time the 
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As of June 2012, total enrollment in Business Express stood at 1,680 
employers, representing 2,489 workers and an additional 1,954 family 
members, for a total of 4,443 lives.27 Not all of these enrolled directly with 
the Connector, however, since many are legacy accounts brought in by 
SBSB. To date then, the Connector’s small-group component clearly has 
failed to meet its goals. Although the Connector did not begin to actively 
market its small-group program until the first part of 2012,28 many 
observers remain skeptical that it will gain much traction, although some 
remain hopeful. The competing reasons, broadly considered, can be 
understood through two sets of factors. The first relates to the Connector’s 
basic value proposition — that is, whether it offers a better, or at least 
equivalent, value compared to the other products and purchasing 
mechanisms available in the market. The second set of factors focus on 
political and institutional factors that might hamper the Connector, apart 
from whether or not it offers better products at lower prices. 
B. The Connector’s Basic Value Proposition 
1. Pricing Issues 
One long-time market regulator and observer stated a point that was 
echoed by many others:  “it’s been really, really hard to figure out what 
value proposition” the Connector has to offer. The most straightforward 
reason for this is community rating, which Massachusetts state law requires 
(as does the new federal law). Community rating requires that insurers offer 
the same prices inside and outside the Connector for the products with 
equivalent actuarial value.29 Therefore, even if the Connector were able to 
generate economies of scale or bargaining power to reduce costs, those 
efficiencies would not be uniquely reflected in prices for the Connector’s 
products, compared to the outside market. Instead, by law, insurers must 
continue to use the same pricing structure for all of their products, 
regardless of the particular sales vehicles. Even then, a number of brokers 
thought that some insurers were charging slightly more through the 
 
second transfer was scheduled to happen, the leading insurers had withdrawn from the 
Connector’s employer program. Some interviewees also thought that insurers objected to the 
transfer, while others thought that SBSB changed its mind on how advantageous the transfer 
would be, either for it, or for its customers. 
 27. COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, CONNECTOR QUARTERLY PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 
(June 2012) [hereinafter CONNECTOR QUARTERLY PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 2012]; 
COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, MONTHLY HEALTH CONNECTOR SUMMARY REPORT (June 2012). 
 28. See, e.g., Press Release, Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., Finding the 
Right Small Business Health Plan Just Got Easier (Feb. 26, 2012). 
 29. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1301(a)(I)(c)(iii), 
124 Stat. 119, 163 (2010). 
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Connector than for similar coverage these insurers offer outside the 
Connector. 
a. Administrative Costs 
Connector officials noted that one clearly demonstrable cost savings 
they achieved is eliminating the fee that the smallest employers paid to 
purchase insurance through intermediary organizations. In Massachusetts, 
most leading insurers other than Blue Cross do not sell small-group 
coverage directly to groups smaller than six employees. Instead, such 
coverage is sold through trade associations, such as SBSB mentioned above 
or the Massachusetts Business Association (MBA), which work with 
independent insurance brokers. Prior to the Connector, these intermediaries 
charged employers a monthly service fee of $35 per employee for 
purchasing health insurance. The Connector reduced this fee to $10 a 
month and then eliminated the fee altogether,30 saving employers $420 a 
year per worker. 
As a result, for a time the Connector’s effective prices for groups smaller 
than six were somewhat lower than the outside market (except for Blue 
Cross). However, the two leading intermediaries soon eliminated most of 
this price advantage by reducing their per employee monthly fee to match 
the Connector’s competition.31 Therefore, although the Connector was able 
to achieve a moderate, one-time reduction in prices across a portion of the 
market, it does not maintain a price advantage, in the eyes of most 
observers. 
Several interviewees (including one Connector board member), felt that 
this apparent cost reduction was not entirely real, however. In their view, the 
Connector still incurs the administrative and sales costs that the employer 
fee funded, and so these costs are being shifted to different parts of the 
market rather than being eliminated. To defray these costs, the Connector 
charges insurers an administrative fee of 2.5% for groups and 3.5% for 
individuals.32 Insurers are able to spread this cost over the premiums they 
charge outside the Connector via their market-wide community rates. 
 
 30. COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM 2011 PROGRESS 
REPORT 7 (2011), available at https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/binary/com.epi 
centric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Health%2520Care%2520Reform/
Overview/ConnectorProgressReport2011.pdf. 
 31. The private intermediaries do still charge an association membership fee of roughly 
$125 per company, which the Connector does not charge. This fee also provides access to 
other association benefits and products. 
 32. COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM 2011 PROGRESS 
REPORT, supra note 30. 
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Although the Connector pays brokers’ commissions out of this fee, 
which saves the insurers that expense, insurers see no savings for individual 
insurance since they pay no commissions for that business. Also, insurers 
believe that the Connector’s administrative services save them little or no 
money since they have to maintain these same services for their non-
Connector clients, and it requires extra effort for insurers to interact with the 
Connector and its TPA. Therefore, insurers believe that the Connector’s fee 
creates a net added expense, on balance. Whichever side might have the 
better of this debate, it appears on balance that the Connector at least does 
not reduce administrative expenses. 
b. Rebates and Tax Credits 
The Connector believes it offers lower prices in two other ways. First, it is 
the exclusive source for employers to receive a 15% rebate that the 
legislature made available, beginning in July 2011, for lower-wage small 
firms that adopt wellness programs.33 Eligibility for this subsidy mirrors the 
eligibility rules for the new federal small-firm tax credit under the ACA.34 
Combined, the state and federal credits could amount to 50% of the 
employer’s contribution to health insurance. Initially, few firms reportedly 
have taken advantage of the wellness rebate, but it was not actively 
marketed until early 2012 and so it is too early to judge its impact. 
Most insurance brokers and other market participants believe the 
wellness subsidy will have a negligible impact. They noted, with near 
unanimity, that the eligibility criteria for this program are too stringent to 
make it widely available or attractive. Some of these reasons echo those 
given for the federal tax credit — that the rebate percentage phases down 
rapidly for firms larger than ten and with average wages more than 
$25,000;35 the rebate reduces employers’ existing tax deduction for 
insurance premiums which further reduces its value; the incentive does not 
apply to the business owner or family members; and there is no promise that 
the subsidy will continue beyond its initial few years of funding. Another 
reason was more specific to Massachusetts:  many interviewees noted that 
wage scales in the Boston area are substantially above national averages,36 
 
 33. Id. at 13. 
 34. ACA § 1421 (codified at I.R.C. 45R (2011)). 
 35. Jon Kingsdale, How Small-Business Health Exchanges Can Offer Value To Their 
Future Customers – And Why They Must, 31 HEALTH AFF. 275, 278 (2012). 
 36. This is confirmed by an independent analysis estimating that Massachusetts has the 
lowest percentage of small firms in the country (other than D.C.) whose wages would qualify 
for the federal tax credit. QUANTRIA STRATEGIES, LLC, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., HEALTH INSURANCE IN 
THE SMALL BUSINESS MARKET: AVAILABILITY, COVERAGE, AND THE EFFECT OF TAX INCENTIVES 59 
(2011), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/386tot.pdf. 
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especially for firms with more white collar workers, and so firms that are 
willing or able to offer insurance are not likely to meet the income limits 
needed to qualify for the program. 
In addition, there was widespread skepticism, and some 
misunderstanding, about the wellness program’s requirements. Some 
people thought, wrongly, that the incentive accrues only if the wellness 
features in fact save money, which they doubt would happen. Others 
thought the wellness program would impose unacceptable demands on 
employers and workers. To the contrary, the actual requirements appear to 
be so lenient that knowledgeable sources referred to them as a “laughable” 
“joke.” Initially, all that is explicitly required is that a third of workers fill out 
a health questionnaire and receive an annual physical, and that employers 
make efforts to create a healthier work environment, although more 
requirements might be added. 
c. Lower-cost Limited Networks 
The second way Connector officials believe they offer lower prices is the 
fact, confirmed by at least two insurers, that the CommChoice platform has 
brought new insurers into the commercial market that have substantially 
lower premiums due to having more limited networks of providers. Some of 
these insurers mainly use safety net hospitals and community health centers 
that focus primarily on lower-income patients covered by Medicaid or by the 
Connector’s subsidized CommCare coverage. These plans with more 
limited networks have prices that are 20-30% below the market leaders. 
Prior to the Connector, several had not offered private coverage (although 
some had), and even now, several of them sell mainly through the 
Connector, by refraining from paying any broker commissions for sales 
outside the Connector.37 Most notably, Neighborhood Health Plan, which is 
based in community health centers, has increased its share of the 
Connector’s private (mostly nongroup) coverage from 18% in 2008 to 43% 
in 2012, which is twice the share of the next largest insurer participating in 
CommCare.38 
Several brokers and employer representatives acknowledged the 
potential appeal of offering lower-cost networks through the Connector. But 
despite this potential, most of the insurers with more limited networks have 
gained only a modest foothold in the Connector. A number of brokers 
interviewed said they are reluctant to, or refuse to, recommend insurers that 
 
 37. Kingsdale, supra note 35, at 279. 
 38. COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, CONNECTOR QUARTERLY PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 
(2008); CONNECTOR QUARTERLY PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 2012, supra note 27, at 4; JON 
KINGSDALE, MASS. HEALTH INS. CONNECTOR AUTH., REPORT TO THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HEALTH CARE REFORM LAW, CHAPTER 58 31 (2008). 
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are less established or recognized, in part because brokers are less familiar 
with these insurers and do not have established working relationships with 
their sales and customer relations staff. Some brokers also were concerned 
about recommending an insurer whose network does not include the major 
teaching hospitals in Boston affiliated with Harvard and Tufts Medical 
Schools. They feared that subscribers would complain if they could not 
access preferred specialists or facilities when they face a serious health 
problem. 
Somewhat paradoxically, other brokers, and sometimes even the same 
brokers, complained that the Connector currently does not include some of 
the newly emerging limited network plans now being offered by the top 
insurers in the market. In response to increasing complaints about high 
insurance costs for small employers, the Massachusetts legislature, in 2010, 
required all established HMOs (those with more than 5,000 individual and 
small group lives) to offer a limited or tiered network option that is priced at 
least 12% below their standard full-network products.39 In response, several 
of the state’s leading insurers recently began to market such products very 
actively, attracting notable interest from brokers and employers. These new 
products are not initially available through the Connector, however, which 
led many brokers to complain that the Connector was “stifling innovation.” 
d. Benefits Standardization and Innovation 
Some interviewees also felt the Connector did not offer sufficient choice 
of higher deductible plans designed to fit with health savings accounts 
(HSA), or other forms of lower benefit options. However, the leading insurers 
in the Connector opposed the Connector allowing their competitors to offer 
only limited benefit or limited network options, for fear this would pull in 
only better risks and leave them exposed to adverse selection. Also, many of 
these criticisms about excessively rich benefit options appear directed toward 
the state’s “minimum creditable coverage” standards, which apply market-
wide and eliminated so-called mini-med plans. These coverage 
requirements are not unique to the Connector, but interviewees tended to 
blame the Connector for them since it is the regulatory authority that set the 
minimum standards. 
Within the Connector, the inability to offer innovations in benefit design 
has been a “sore subject,” according to some insurer representatives, since 
originally innovation was one of the Connector’s “mantras.” One insurer 
took advantage of the Connector’s invitation to innovate by creating a 
coverage option that combined a high deductible structure for specialist 
 
 39. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 288, § 23 (2010). Tiered networks are those that include a 
broad array of providers but place them into different tiers, with varying cost-sharing for 
patients, designed to encourage use of lower-cost providers. 
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care and hospitalization with first-dollar coverage for primary care. This 
insurer felt its innovative product was popular, but then the Connector 
decided, based on focus groups, that its initial range of options was too 
confusing to individuals, so it required the insurer to eliminate all 
nonconforming plans.40 Several brokers also noted that the Connector 
primarily offers HMO products, which lack the out-of-network feature 
needed to enroll people who live in bordering states. 
Other insurers and observers, however, said that standardization of 
benefits was not a major problem, despite some “quibbling,” “whining and 
gnashing of teeth.” They agreed that simplification of benefit options is 
necessary in order for the Connector to sell directly to individuals because 
too much choice “can be numbing,” causing people to “freeze like deer in 
the headlights.” The Connector’s decision on how to standardize was said 
(by several sources) to be a “collaborative” process that relied heavily on 
input from insurers. But, some insurers and brokers sympathetic to the need 
for standardization for most Connector products still felt insurers should be 
allowed to offer one or two nonstandard options that are selling well outside 
that Connector, in order to facilitate innovation. They explained that, 
although Massachusetts historically has been a rich benefit state, this is 
changing rapidly with most small groups now “crossing the Rubicon” into 
high-deductible plans. 
Taking note of these criticisms, since 2010 the Connector has offered 
HSA-qualified high-deductible plans, although deductibles are capped at 
$2,000 for individuals and $4,000 for families, substantially below the 
federal limits.41 More recently, the Connector announced that, beginning in 
2013, insurers may offer one or more narrow (restricted) network products 
that cover the standardized benefit plans, and they may propose one or 
more innovative nonstandard benefit options.42 
 
 40. Jenifer E. Urff, Determining Health Benefit Designs to be Offered on a State Health 
Insurance Exchange, HEALTH REFORM TOOLKIT SERIES: RESOURCES FROM THE MASS. EXPERIENCE 
103, 113 (Nov. 2011). Note that standardization of benefits is distinct from offering benefits 
in tiers, identified by precious metals (or Olympic medals, such as Gold, Silver, Bronze, etc.). 
The metal tiers are based on a plan’s actuarial value determined largely to copayments and 
deductibles, that is, what percent of covered benefits are paid by the insurer rather than the 
patient. A given actuarial value can be achieved through a wide variety of benefit structures. 
Therefore, Connector officials concluded based on market research that additional 
standardization of copayments and deductibles is needed to simplify choices beyond merely 
arraying them in actuarial tiers. 
 41. Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, 956 MASS. CODE REGS. 
5.03(2) (2008). 
 42. Roni Mansur, Chief Operating Officer, & Sarah Stephany, Program Coordinator, 
Mass. Health Connector, Presentation at the Mass. Health Connector Board of Directors 
Meeting: Commonwealth Choice 2013 Seal of Approval (May 10, 2012). 
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Interestingly, the absence of non-health products in the Connector was 
not a matter of concern for most brokers. Brokers often arrange “ancillary” 
products and services for employers, such as optional life, dental, disability 
and long-term care insurance, and flexible spending accounts, 401(k) plans, 
and the like. Outside the Connector there are vendors that provide “one-
stop shopping” for a suite of employee benefits, which the Connector does 
not do. However, brokers almost uniformly said that they are well equipped 
to package health insurance from one source with ancillary benefits from 
another source — which they often do in any event, even when not using 
the Connector.43 
2. Enhanced Choice 
Aside from price, the other main way the Connector seeks to improve 
market options for small employers is to offer a superior mechanism to shop 
for coverage. For all of its programs, the Connector touts the ease of 
making side-by-side comparisons online of insurers’ prices and benefits — 
which contrasts with the confusion and complexity of shopping insurer by 
insurer in the regular market. In addition, the Connector attempted to 
enhance the degree of choice available to workers in small firms by piloting 
its Contributory Plan, noted above. 
a. Employee Choice 
We begin with a focus on the special features of the Contributory Plan. 
A variety of explanations were given, repeatedly and by different sources, for 
why this pilot was not successful. Most basically, there was some skepticism 
about how much employers actually value letting workers choose their own 
coverage. In favor of choice, some brokers, employer representatives, and 
other observers felt that employers would like this option once they 
experience it, but in Massachusetts employers were not yet used to the idea 
so they were not drawn strongly to it initially. These sources pointed to the 
fact that, among employers who did enroll, the reported level of satisfaction 
was very high,44 and those who signed up have tended to remain with the 
product longer than normal. According to one senior employer 
representative, some employers thought this program “was the greatest 
thing, they loved it” — a sentiment confirmed by several others. 
 
 43. Moreover, many employers either do not purchase any ancillary services and 
products, or they purchase them elsewhere. In a recent national survey, only a third of small 
employers who used an agent to purchase health insurance also used the agent to purchase 
some other type of business insurance. NFIB RESEARCH FOUND., SMALL BUSINESS AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE: ONE YEAR AFTER ENACTMENT OF PPACA 7 (2011), available at http://www.nfib. 
com/research-foundation/surveys/healthcare-year1. 
 44. IERNA, supra note 23, at 16. 
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Other choice proponents felt that there is real potential for a “defined 
contribution” model in which employers give workers a voucher of a fixed 
amount to spend on health insurance any way they wish, but they 
complained that the Connector eschewed a genuine version of this model. 
Instead, the Connector required (for reasons noted below) that employers 
select a reference plan and agree to pay at least 50% of its premium, and 
employees were then allowed to pick alternative insurers or plans only with 
the same benefit tier. 
It was noted in response to these objections that the Connector’s 
reference plan model was based on the design used by the very successful 
private exchange in Connecticut (Connecticut Business and Industry 
Association).45 Also, it is not immediately obvious why these variations from 
a pure defined contribution approach would necessarily weaken the 
Connector’s approach to individual choice. In the pilot, two thirds of 
workers ended up staying with the reference plan selected by their employer 
rather than picking a cheaper or more expensive option.46 Therefore, as one 
knowledgeable source said, perhaps the employee choice idea was simply 
“ahead of its time” — something that most employers and workers did not 
fully appreciate because they were so used to the idea of picking a single 
broad network for the entire workforce. 
Others, however, believed that — while individual choice is a “noble 
aim” and “interesting concept” that, “at least on paper,” “sounds [like a] 
fantastic” idea that could “completely revolutionize the market” — in 
practice employee choice is either inherently too complicated or is not 
sufficiently meaningful to make a real difference. According to doubters, the 
employee choice option is, at best, only a “niche product” that will never 
capture a large segment of the market. One experienced source said that 
most small employers “just want something credible” and “simple,” and they 
“don’t want to take the time to figure out” something complicated. Because 
employee choice is a different way of doing things whose details are not 
easily understood, employers and brokers tended to “approach [this new 
idea] with caution,” according to one very experienced market participant. 
Inherent complications are noted below. Regarding whether choice 
matters, these skeptics felt that differences were too minor among covered 
benefits and networks offered by the leading insurers for choice to be very 
meaningful. “It’s a facade of choice,” in the view of one broker, because the 
benefit options and most of the major provider networks are the same. An 
employer representative objected that employees were allowed only to 
 
 45. ROBERT L. CAREY & JONATHAN M. GRUBER, MARYLAND ASS’N OF HEALTH UNDERWRITERS, 
A HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE FOR MARYLAND? COMPARING MASSACHUSETTS AND MARYLAND 7 
(2010), available at http://www.marylandahu.com/downloads/mahu_exchange_study.pdf. 
 46. Kingsdale, supra note 35, at 278. 
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choose within a tier, but that having “vertical choice” among benefit tiers is 
more important than “horizontal choice” among insurers with similar 
benefits. Or, as a broker put it, he would prefer a “Willy Wonka elevator,” 
one that doesn’t go merely side to side (within a tier) or up and down 
(across tiers), but that also allows shoppers to “zig and zag” in both 
dimensions. 
b. Complications 
A related but counteracting concern, shared by several brokers, is that 
the employee choice feature required much more effort to explain to 
employers and workers than selling the employer a single plan. As one 
broker put it, “how many conversations do you want to have to help 
everyone figure this out” for just $10 a month per worker? This thought that 
employee choice might be a good feature if “there were a way to pay for 
advising employees” about how to make their selections. Absent that, when 
employers want to offer employee choice, he prefers to set up a tax-
sheltered health reimbursement account (HRA), since that more clearly takes 
the employer out of the role of choosing or sponsoring a health plan. In 
contrast, the Connector’s approach conveyed the sense that the employer, 
and hence the broker, was still responsible for helping employees decide 
which insurance option they should select. 
Another complication of the Connector’s pilot program is that an 
employer could not know the exact amount of its contribution until workers 
make their selection, since their precise age-mix determined the base 
premium, under community rating rules that allow two-fold variation based 
on age.47 To make the choice model function properly required 
“convoluted” pricing calculations, which “you need a Ph.D. to understand.” 
Age rating creates greater complexity in an individual choice model due to 
the key difference between “composite rating” and “list billing.” 
Conventionally, employers in many (but not all) states receive a composite 
rate that reflects the blend of ages in their covered workforce at the time that 
workers sign up. The result is that neither the employer’s nor the employee’s 
contribution varies according to age. Composite rating works when an 
 
 47. Insurers also are allowed, until 2014, to vary rates according to group size to reflect 
the greater adverse selection that occurs among smaller groups. But, group size rating is 
difficult to implement in an individual choice model because insurers do not know how many 
workers will sign up at the point they are asked to quote the rate that employees use to pick a 
plan. See generally INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY SOLUTIONS, STUDY OF SHOP EXCHANGE: ANALYSIS 
OF KEY MARYLAND SHOP-RELATED POLICY OPTIONS (2011), available at http://dhmh.maryland. 
gov/exchange/pdf/FinalSHOPExchangeIHPS_1.pdf. Other difficulties and frustrations noted by 
agents related to the fact that, for various technical reasons, the web interface showed the 
employer only how much it was contributing, and not what the total premium would be. 
According to one, “it was just weird – a whole different way of” comparing plans and prices. 
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insurer enrolls the entire group, but not when workers can select different 
insurers. Then, each insurer will want to bill separately for each worker, 
according to the worker’s age — which is known as “list billing.” Not only 
does this make the employer more aware of inherent cost differences, but 
employers then face the dilemma of whether to make different employees 
contribute different amounts to their insurance premiums. 
List-billing is an accepted market practice in a number of other states, 
but it was not so in Massachusetts. The Connector attempted to mediate this 
“dicey” issue by using a blended composite rate for all workers who selected 
the employer’s reference plan, but it used list-billing for those who selected 
alternative plans. This solution created two problems. Employers found the 
multi-page billing statements “really confusing,” and so their brokers had to 
spend significant time understanding and explaining these complexities, 
which they found “exasperating,” according to a Connector source. 
Second, when employees found out (by talking among themselves) that 
employers were requiring some workers to contribute more than others to 
health plans that basically were very similar, workers were understandably 
upset. This disparity arose not only because some employees selected less 
expensive coverage, but also because those who selected alternative 
coverage had their premium contribution determined by their actual age 
rather than by the company’s composite rate that applied to the blended 
ages under the reference plan. According to Connector officials, this 
differing approach to age rating was done in part to accommodate 
concerns by some board members that pure list billing would result in age 
discrimination. However, officials despaired that mixing composite with list 
billing in this “overly engineered” fashion “really mucks up the works” in 
ways that “become very difficult to explain to anyone who is not an 
actuary.”48 
c. Adverse Selection 
Other problems with the Contributory Plan related to the fact that it was 
a pilot program, which some former Connector officials believe “doomed it 
 
 48. Moreover, this approach creates a third potential problem: Composite rating for one 
product but list-billed age rating for other products creates an inherent bias towards older 
workers choosing the reference plan and younger workers opting for alternative coverage. 
This age sorting did not materialize in the Connector’s limited pilot. However, a couple of 
observers noted that adverse selection might have occurred if this rating structure had 
remained in place longer such that agents became more aware of this discrepancy and began 
to advise workers about how to take advantage of it. For thoughtful analysis of other, more 
complex ways to deal with these difficulties, see RICK CURTIS & ED NEUSCHLER, INST. FOR HEALTH 
POLICY SOLUTIONS, SMALL-EMPLOYER (“SHOP”) EXCHANGE ISSUES 18 (2011), available 
at http://www.healthexchange.ca.gov/Documents/Small%20Employer%20(SHOP)%20Ex 
change%20Issues.pdf; INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY SOLUTIONS, supra note 47, at 24. 
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from the start.” It was introduced as a limited test in order to overcome 
strong objections from some of the major insurers, including Blue Cross, 
who feared they would experience serious adverse selection if employees 
were allowed to opt out of the reference plan selected by the employer. Blue 
Cross based this concern on its experience in the nongroup segment of the 
market, where it documented receiving enrollment with a worse risk profile 
than in its small group segment. Blue Cross, along with some of the other 
leading insurers, reasoned that sicker individuals will tend to choose plans 
with the broadest networks and healthier patients will opt for cheaper limited 
networks, leaving them with the “worst of the litter.” 
For these reasons, one leading insurer conceded that an employee 
choice approach “scares the you know what out of us.” Multiple sources 
explained that, to “assuage” this “paranoia” and “big bugaboo” over 
adverse selection, the Connector agreed to control the program’s size and 
profile by conducting it as a limited pilot. Otherwise, some or all of the 
leading insurers would have refused to participate. This accommodation 
brought the leading insurers on board “only grudgingly” (according to 
several sources in so many words), but it meant that the pilot was done “with 
three hands tied behind our back,” according to one Connector official, or 
“with one foot in the grave,” according to a benefits consultant. 
For instance, the pilot status meant that the new program was not 
advertised. To limit size and focus its training efforts, the Connector made 
the pilot available to only about 20 brokers rather than open it to the 
market as a whole.49 But, to avoid unfairness to nonparticipating brokers, 
the participating brokers could enroll only their existing clients rather than 
using the Contributory Plan to “poach” new business from other brokers.50 
This removed any ability for brokers to promote the new program in order to 
gain new business. Moreover, they realized from the outset that the pilot 
might not be continued. 
By design, then, the pilot program was never intended to enroll large 
numbers. The initial hope was to enroll 100 firms with 1000 workers (over 
no specified time period).51 But, after almost a year, the pilot ended up 
enrolling a maximum of only 77 employers and 207 workers.52 
An additional reason it failed to do better is that adverse selection 
concerns caused Blue Cross, the market leader, to charge ten percent more 
through the Connector than in the outside market. It was allowed to do so, 
 
 49. Joshua D. Archambault, Massachusetts Health Care Reform has Left Small Business 
Behind: A Warning to the States, No. 2462 BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 16, 2010, at 4, 4, 
available at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2462.pdf. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. CONNECTOR QUARTERLY PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 2010, supra note 22. 
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despite community rating rules, because the state allows insurers (until 
2014) to use a group size factor in their community rates, to capture the 
element of adverse selection that inherently attaches to choices made by 
smaller groups.53 Because the employee choice model slices groups that are 
already small into even smaller units (“twosies and threesies”), Blue Cross 
(and other insurers) had regulatory authority to add this ten percent 
surcharge, which would obviously tend to discourage its customers from 
switching to the Connector. 
Despite these concerns, adverse selection did not materialize in this 
limited pilot (although it was too short-lived to draw strong conclusions from 
the experience). An evaluation done after the pilot’s first year found that 
average ages were virtually identical for those who kept the employer’s 
reference plan and those who selected an alternative.54 Also, of the 35 
people who selected an alternative plan, about half selected something 
more expensive, and they also were not substantially older than those who 
opted for cheaper coverage. This does not resolve the issue conclusively, 
however, because risk status was assessed only through crude 
demographics and not actual costs, disease burden or care utilization. Also, 
adverse selection patterns may take longer than this pilot period to become 
pronounced. Nevertheless, the Connector’s assessment found that the pilot 
succeeded in avoiding the problems that were initially feared. 
d. A Change of Heart 
Why did the Connector not promote the pilot into a full scale program, 
with an ambitious advertising campaign like the one that successfully 
launched its other, individual-enrollment programs? In the end, no 
important constituency was enthusiastic about the idea, so it “just wouldn’t 
be worth it” to undergo the “headache of fixing it,” according to multiple 
sources. In addition to tepid response from employers and resistance or 
opposition by insurers and brokers, several of the people interviewed 
pointed to the social views of some “pro-consumer” “paternalistic” “lefty” 
members of the Connector Board, who they felt were philosophically 
opposed to moving in the direction of defined contribution by employers. 
Coupled with this lackluster reception was a different opportunity 
presented to the Connector in late 2009 to jumpstart a critical mass of 
enrollment by transferring SBSB’s existing block of business to the 
 
 53. DANIEL APICELLA, COMMONWEALTH HEALTH CONNECTOR, PLANNING FOR A RISK 
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM IN MASSACHUSETTS 12 (2012), available at http://www.nescso.org/User 
Files/pdfs/D-Apicella-Massachusetts-Risk-.pdf. The smaller the group, the more that insurance 
purchasing decisions are likely to reflect the health conditions of individual employees, 
including those of the business owner. 
 54. IERNA, supra note 23, at 9. 
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Connector.55 As noted above, the Connector contracts with SBSB to 
administer its unsubsidized private insurance programs. SBSB is one of two 
large “intermediaries” in the market that enroll the majority of employers 
with fewer than six workers. To consolidate this dual role, SBSB was willing 
to transfer its 17,000 subscribers to the Connector, and the Connector was 
eager to receive this bolus of enrollment — in part because it was under 
increasing “political pressure” to show the Governor tangible results in 
“delivering something to employers.” 
For SBSB to seamlessly transfer its existing groups to the Connector, 
however, the Connector had to conform its small group program to the 
structure that existed in the outside market. This meant abandoning the 
employee choice features, regardless of how well or poorly the pilot might 
be seen to have gone. We turn, next, then to learn how choice features 
functioned under the next iteration, known as Business Express. 
e. Employer Shopping 
Along with providing employees a choice of plans and making it easier 
to compare plans, the Connector also seeks to improve the shopping 
process for employers. Even though it offers the same basic array of insurers 
and products available in the broader market, the Connector aims to make 
the key comparisons among these products more transparent, in order to 
facilitate competition.56 For the smallest employers, some degree of 
comparison-shopping was available before the Connector was in place via 
the trade association intermediaries noted above. However, Blue Cross does 
not deal with these intermediaries and the product offerings are not 
standardized. As a result, without a broker it is not feasible outside the 
Connector to obtain side-by-side comparisons, on an apples-to-apples 
basis, of plans offered by all of the leading insurers. This point was 
highlighted in a recent New York Times article, which contrasted one 
Massachusetts business person who had found it “astoundingly 
complicated” to shop for coverage outside the Connector and so “ultimately 
gave up trying” because it “was impossible to compare plans,” with another 
individual (nongroup) shopper who said the Connector’s website was 
“super-easy to take a quick look and figure out which price range we 
wanted . . . and then dive down deep into one or two of them.”57 
 
 55. MASS. HEALTH CONNECTOR, REP. TO THE MASS. LEG.: IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH CARE 
REFORM 14 (Nov. 2010). 
 56. AMY M. LISCHKO, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMONWEALTH 
HEALTH INSURANCE CONNECTOR: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 11 (2009). 
 57. Abby Goodnough, Navigating the Health Care Maze, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at 
A14. 
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Insurance brokers and employer representatives did not share this 
enthusiasm, however. Instead, the following kinds of complaints were heard, 
repeatedly, mainly from brokers. First, brokers felt that they are well 
equipped to present informed shopping choices to their employer clients, by 
using their own tailored spreadsheets based on information they obtain 
directly from insurers. Because most small employers purchase insurance 
through brokers, brokers’ expertise greatly mitigates the complexity of 
navigating the market and thus the Connector’s comparative information 
advantage. 
Second, brokers noted that they would not be doing their clients justice if 
they abandoned their spreadsheets and relied only on the Connector. Thus, 
even if the Connector’s portal might be simpler and more complete, from a 
broker’s point of view it presents only an additional layer of work, rather 
than a means to simplify their search efforts. Even brokers who use the 
Connector said, repeatedly, that this ends up being “more work for less 
money,” since they continue to also obtain quotes and explore benefits 
options directly with insurers and the private intermediaries. As one 
explained who is in favor of the Connector, “my business is finding the 
smallest of advantages for my customer,” and so he compares Connector 
options with the rest of the market, to see where he might save one or two 
percent. “That’s all more work, but I love” the challenge. Other brokers, 
however, seemed to resent the “extra work” of shopping the Connector 
alongside the regular market. 
Brokers further noted that there is a greater diversity of plan types and 
coverage options available outside the Connector, and so providing 
thorough advice requires continuing to search the outside options. Thus, 
they saw the Connector’s standardization of benefits as a disadvantage, 
despite its facilitating head-to-head comparisons, since brokers see value in 
having as many options as possible for them to help employers sort through. 
Several touted the fact that, outside the Connector, they can search through 
up to 80 plan options, whereas the Connector presents only about a half 
dozen. 
f. Service and Information Technology Issues 
Finally, brokers complained, sometimes bitterly, about “cumbersome,” 
“inept,” and “antiquated” features of the Connector’s shopping interface 
(administered by SBSB) that made it more difficult, not less, than dealing 
with insurers directly or through the existing intermediaries. According to a 
more charitable view, the Connector’s plan comparison systems function 
well enough, but they’re “just not what we’re used to,” and so takes some 
time and effort to learn. 
One feature that drew complaints is the Connector’s “nightmare” 
requirement that brokers (or employers) enter tax identification numbers and 
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employee demographics before they can receive a quote, which also then 
requires that the broker have a unique password for each group. The 
Connector explained that these are requirements that some insurers insist 
on, to make sure their quotes are accurate — since rates depend on age, 
location and industry category. Another explanation given is that Blue Cross 
in particular insisted on this level of extra detail in order to determine 
whether its existing clients are considering switching to the Connector, and 
thus possibly to their competitors. 
Regardless of the justification, brokers objected that this kind of 
information is not required to obtain quotes elsewhere, and that demanding 
this level and type of information from employers simply to give them quotes 
is not a good way to solicit business from a new client. Several brokers also 
criticized the Connector’s renewal process for being much more 
cumbersome than renewals done directly with insurers. The Connector 
reportedly requires detailed information to be re-entered from scratch each 
year rather than assuming continuity of the workforce unless changes are 
noted.58 
In addition, many brokers complained that the Connector’s website at 
times did not function well, or that they could not receive the assistance they 
wanted by phone. According to several brokers, after entering lots of 
information the website would freeze and all the information would need to 
be entered again, simply to obtain a quote. Also, when brokers needed to 
speak with someone on the phone, several complained that the Connector’s 
TPA initially was “horrible” because it was much harder to reach than staff 
with insurers (“awful,” 45 minute wait times) or TPA staff did not have 
answers to basic questions and “were hard to work with,” at least at the 
outset. Some brokers complained that having various functions and 
responsibilities divided among the Connector, its TPA, and the insurer “can 
be very confusing, dealing with two or three layers,” compared to “dealing 
with an insurer directly.” Also, several brokers said they value the “certain 
type of access” they have when they are able to “pick up the phone” and 
reach the right insurer representative who can deal with a client’s problem 
directly, rather than going through an intermediary. 
Not all interviewees shared these negative views, however. Some 
brokers, noted significant improvement over time in service and website 
 
 58. According to two sources, renewals are more troublesome for some insurers than 
others because some insurers guarantee a composite rate for a year, thus assuming the risk of 
changes in a group’s demographics, and so they need more detailed demographic 
information at renewal in order to “true up” the group’s composite rate (whereas other 
insurers require the composite rate to be periodically updated throughout the year). Another 
agent complained that minor discrepancies in the renewal process can result in employers 
being automatically dropped, leaving them uninsured for a time. 
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problems. According to one, the TPA and Connector staff are “easy to work 
with, really smart, on top of things, very responsive and helpful.” Another 
noted that some of the bureaucratic hurdles are imposed by insurers, not the 
Connector. For instance, selling group coverage to a sole proprietor often 
requires extremely thorough (or “crazy”) documentation that the person has 
a legitimate business in Massachusetts, but it is wrong to blame the 
Connector for these demands imposed by insurers. Insurers themselves did 
not complain about, or were not aware of, any problems with the 
Connector’s online interface and how its TPA is servicing accounts, despite 
their having a significant stake in these matters. 
Some brokers noted that views differ depending on how comfortable 
brokers and employers are with using a computer online for complex and 
important matters, in contrast with “older brokers” whose secretaries “do the 
paperwork.” One broker, for instance, said that “trying to make [insurance 
selection] computer driven just makes you deeply confused,” even for 
“doctors and lawyer clients, . . . forget about plumbers, electricians.” And, 
another broker noted that some clients do not have the ready access to 
computers needed to take advantage of the Connector’s systems, and so 
they still need live customer service after hours (when they are not at work). 
In contrast, other brokers said that most of their business and client 
interactions are done by computer, which they and clients “love.” One 
broker who has placed a fair amount of business with the Connector noted 
that, although aspects of the experience can be frustrating, once employers 
are signed up, most of them remain because they have fewer “hassles.” 
Overall, as one Connector official summed it up, “until you work in the 
guts of health insurance, you don’t realize” that the operational complexity 
of the group market is “ten times harder” than the nongroup market, and so 
it’s a “stepwise process” in which “you can’t achieve perfection on day one.” 
Accordingly, one barely sympathetic broker opined that “we should cut them 
some slack [since at least] their heart's in the right place.” Another broker 
agreed with colleagues that there had “been some hiccups along the way,” 
but on the whole, the Connector has “actually done a good job” — a view 
echoed by a well-informed former government official, who thought that 
“it’s a real testament to everyone [involved with the Connector] that they 
could find middle ground of some kind” between all of the competing 
considerations entailed in figuring out how to “differentiate itself in the 
market without being a threat” to insurers and brokers. That is “not an easy 
dilemma to solve.” 
C. Political, Institutional, and Miscellaneous Factors 
Even if the Connector did everything just right and offered superior 
choice at a better price, its success might be foiled by opposition from key 
constituencies based on political, economic, or institutional factors. The 
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Connector, after all, is a quasi-governmental agency that exercises 
regulatory authority, and many business people are hostile to government 
regulation or take a dim view of the competency or propriety of government 
entering directly into the private market. Many insurers might naturally resist 
efforts to change the basis on which they compete. Brokers might view the 
Connector as especially threatening since, if it were to succeed in vastly 
improving the shopping process, employers might no longer need brokers. 
On the other hand, some insurers and brokers might welcome the 
Connector as a vehicle for gaining a better market foothold. Interviews 
explored whether and to what extent views such as these prevailed. 
1. Employers’ Views 
Among employers, there were only moderate signs of “knee jerk” 
resistance to the Connector based on its governmental auspices. This is 
confirmed by a statewide survey that found that only one-third of small 
employers would be “uncomfortable” buying health benefits through the 
Connector “because it is a quasi-governmental agency.”59 But, several 
sources noted that Massachusetts generally is more receptive to “big 
government” than other states, so any signs of resistance based on 
government “stigma” does not bode well for likely attitudes in other states. 
Two business group representatives felt that employers had some 
reluctance to deal with the Connector as a governmental agency, but 
another long-time employer representative thought the small business 
community in Massachusetts realizes they lack the market clout of large 
business and so they are seeking the government’s help to rein in costs. 
Several other knowledgeable sources said they had not noticed any 
indications of employer “hostility” to the Connector, and that many 
employers were at least willing to “take a look at it” to see if it offers better 
value. 
Indeed, several sources said the Connector has a very positive 
reputation in the general community, based on how effectively it has 
overseen and implemented Massachusetts’ health reform law. According to 
one benefits advisor, “People are pretty amazed about what they were able 
to accomplish in a short period of time.” Others said the Connector has a 
lot of “credibility,” and so at least some employers respect the “seal of 
approval” it confers on plans that it offers. One key source thought that 
employers view the Connector more favorably than it deserves, by wrongly 
 
 59. Jon R. Gabel, Heidi Whitmore & Jeremy Pickreign, Report from Massachusetts: 
Employers Largely Support Health Care Reform, and Few Signs of Crowd-Out Appear, 27 
HEALTH AFF. w13, w21 (2008). This response was given by a quarter of small employers that 
offer coverage and half of those that do not. The overall sample size was 629 small 
employers. 
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assuming that it provides a subsidized rate for private insurance. According 
to one broker, when she talks to employers about the Connector, they often 
think she is suggesting that they join a Medicaid-type program — a false 
notion that takes extra effort for her to disabuse with clients. 
Rather than negative impressions of the Connector, interviewees more 
often mentioned general lack of awareness by employers. Confirming this, 
an employer survey conducted by the state each year reported that, in 
2010, only 44% of employers offering health insurance were familiar with 
the Connector (and only 37% of those who do not offer insurance). Several 
people praised the Connector’s “innovative and creative” marketing of its 
nongroup and subsidized components,60 but, as Connector officials 
conceded, marketing for their employer component has been virtually 
“nonexistent.” Initially, this is because it was run as a pilot program. Then, 
just after the revised employer program was launched, all the leading 
insurers withdrew for two years, as explained more below, and the 
Connector did not want to market a program that did not include them. 
With the major insurers rejoining in 2012, the Connector began to market 
the small group program very actively, just at the time interviews were being 
conducted for this study, and many interview subjects had heard or seen 
them. But, at the same time, there was also active marketing by a new, 
competing private purchasing cooperative operated by an employer trade 
group, which tended to steal some of the Connector’s thunder. 
2. Insurers’ Views 
a. Generally 
As just mentioned, in early 2010 the market’s four largest insurers, 
representing 90% of the small group market, suddenly withdrew or refused 
to join the second iteration of the Connector’s small group program, a 
month after its launch.61 This crisis, which many people called a “boycott,” 
occurred at the same time as the Governor’s high profile decision in March 
2010 to flatly deny any rate increases for most of these insurers’ small group 
products.62 This decision hit “like a meteor” on the eve of the annual 
renewal date for many Massachusetts groups (which typically occurs April 
1). Blue Cross attributed its nonparticipation in the Connector’s new small 
 
 60. For more detail, see JENIFER E. URFF, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MASS., IMPLEMENTING 
A SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC EDUCATION AND MARKETING CAMPAIGN TO PROMOTE STATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXCHANGES, HEALTH REFORM TOOLKIT SERIES: RESOURCES FROM THE MASS. EXPERIENCE 
(2011). 
 61. Archambault, supra note 49, at 6. 
 62. Kevin Sack, Massachusetts Insurance Regulators Reject Most Requests for Higher 
Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at A14. 
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group program to needing more time to work through the necessary systems 
changes with the Connector, rather than a response to the Governor’s rate 
freeze. Regardless of the reason, when Blue Cross refused to join the revised 
program, the other three leading insurers, according to multiple sources, 
also left and would not return until Blue Cross first agreed to do so, two 
years hence. 
It is understandable that major insurers would refuse to play ball with a 
government that abruptly denied any rate increase for small groups. But, it is 
less obvious why none of the other insurers would re-enter until Blue Cross 
was appeased. With Blue Cross having the largest share of a highly 
competitive market, one might have expected that business rivalry could 
cause one or more insurers to break rank in order to seize some of Blue 
Cross’ market share. 
Several explanations were given. Several people rotely recited the 
mantra that, as the “800 pound” market leader, when Blue Cross does 
something, “everyone else takes notice.” A couple of people speculated 
that, under a dynamic where the largest plan tends to experience more 
adverse selection, it may be that no one else wanted to be at the front of the 
firing line, especially considering that the Connector generally attracts only 
the smallest groups, which tend to have higher risks. As a source at one 
insurer admitted, faced with this risk of adverse selection, “we felt that if Blue 
Cross isn't going to play nice, we can't be the only ones who play nice.” 
The most convincing explanation heard was simply that none of the 
leading insurers is especially eager to participate in the Connector. “They 
would all just as soon the Connector just go away,” according to one Board 
member — a sentiment echoed in interviewers by at least one of the 
insurers. This insurer explained that, initially they joined to be sure not to 
miss out on a possible change in the market, but now that they see the 
market has remained largely the same, they feel “stuck.” This and other 
insurers intimated that they deal with the Connector in large part in order to 
be a “good corporate citizen” and because it would be “political disaster” if 
they did not. But, with Blue Cross carrying the most political and institutional 
weight in the state, other reluctant health plans felt that they were safe to 
demur until Blue Cross rejoined. 
b. Blue Cross 
For these several reasons, the view, frequently heard, appears well-
founded, that Blue Cross’s influence “as the big kid on the block” is such 
that “it can call the tune” and ”set the rules.” According to observers, this 
solidarity among leading insurers meant that the Connector had to come to 
terms with Blue Cross over numerous, sometimes “maddening,” operational 
details since, if Blue Cross “would not play,” neither would the others. This 
created the impression, among many, that leading insurers, including Blue 
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Cross, “mounted an organized campaign” to resist the Connector’s 
employer program “every step of the way,” in ways that “just made [the 
Connector’s] life miserable.” Two people said that insurers’ objections often 
were only “smoke and mirrors,” since some objections voiced about the 
employer program were not heard earlier about the nongroup program, 
and once one issue was resolved “there would be two other” new ones. 
Observers speculated that Blue Cross “didn’t want to play” because 
“they were fat and happy the way things were,” and so they could only lose 
from the Connector’s new approach. Some informed sources found this 
position quite reasonable, since in fact Blue Cross has substantially less 
market share inside the Connector than in the rest of the market, and 
because people who change insurers are probably better risks, on average, 
than those who remain (a general phenomenon known as “adverse 
retention”63). These sources felt that this attitude is not peculiar to Blue Cross 
since it would likely be shared by any dominant insurer. Several others noted 
that Blue Cross deserves some credit for having helped to bring about the 
state’s health care reform law in the first instance, and that, more recently, 
Blue Cross has become more cooperative with the Connector, under the 
leadership of its new CEO and President, who is “true to [the nonprofit] 
mission” and wants to “do the right thing.” 
Another explanation for Blue Cross’s reluctance is the role of SBSB, the 
Connector’s contracted administrator for private insurance. As noted above, 
“part of the strange stew” in Massachusetts (in the words of a 
knowledgeable observer) is that SBSB and Blue Cross are competitors. SBSB 
sells insurance from Blue Cross’ competitors, but not from Blue Cross, 
because Blue Cross’ policy has been to sell its small group coverage directly 
(and through independent brokers). Because of Blue Cross’s larger market 
share, it could afford to invest in the systems and personnel needed to 
service very small accounts directly. It prefers to do this rather than turn 
these key roles over to a third party, whose handling of matters affects 
customer relations and brand identity. Other leading insurers had decided 
that it was more economical to outsource service for all of their groups of 
five or fewer to intermediaries such as SBSB. These insurers sell to these 
groups only through intermediaries, and never directly. 
Despite this competitive alignment, the Connector hired SBSB to 
administer its private insurance programs because it needed a firm that had 
the experience and established relationships with most of the market’s health 
plans. Also, the reform law required the Connector to use an administrator 
domiciled in the state. Blue Cross did not object to SBSB’s role in 
 
 63. David Cutler et al., Selection Stories: Understanding Movement Across Health Plans, 
29 J. HEALTH ECON. 821, 823 (2010). 
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administering nongroup coverage, but when it came to small group 
business, Blue Cross was not willing to cede some of its administrative 
functions to SBSB. Moreover, it felt that it was unfair to have to pay a service 
fee to the Connector to help support its SBSB contract, for services that 
duplicated what Blue Cross already provided to small groups and did not 
want to relinquish. 
This uncomfortable alignment spawned a host of technical issues that 
were difficult to resolve, that delayed Blue Cross’ re-joining the small group 
program, and that still bedevil it to some extent. For instance, one key to 
giving accurate quotes to insurance shoppers is to have direct access to 
each insurer’s specific rating criteria, which determine how much rates vary 
by allowable factors such as age, location, business sector, and group 
size.64 Other insurers were already used to sharing this competitively 
sensitive information with SBSB, but Blue Cross was not. Dealing with these 
“control issues” required “cumbersome” work-arounds behind the scenes to 
allow Blue Cross’ small-group products to be quoted alongside its 
competitors, according to various sources. 
Such complexities are not unique to the Blue Cross and SBSB situation, 
though. According to Connector officials, employer exchanges have to work 
through many business rules that might affect profits, costs or perceived 
fairness, and for each issue different insurers may want to do things in a 
different way. Examples include: how to validate information in applications, 
how soon to cancel insurance for nonpayment, and when and how much 
enrollment can be retroactive. Substantial sums of money are at stake, and 
each insurer has its own existing systems in place. Therefore, it is a 
“challenge” to keep them all “at the table” working to find consensus 
around a common approach. 
3. Brokers’ Views 
Next, we come to the critical perspective of independent insurance 
agents (also known as brokers). It has been widely noted that they are key to 
the success of group market structures because the great majority of small 
employers rely on them for advice about purchasing insurance.65 Small 
 
 64. Terry Gardiner, Health Insurance Exchanges of Past and Present Offer Examples of 
Features that Could Attract Small-Business Customers, 31 HEALTH AFF. 284, 287 (2012); Mark 
A. Hall, The Role of Independent Agents in the Success of Health Insurance Market Reforms, 
78 MILBANK Q. 23, 41 (2000). Blue Cross objected that if rating decisions could be made 
independently by the Connector, then minor differences in how the calculations are made or 
what information is gathered might result in discrepant quotes to the same group for the same 
coverage, from two different sources. If so, Blue Cross was concerned that agents would learn 
to “fool the system” by comparing Blue Cross quotes obtained from different sources. 
 65. In one recent national survey, 79% of small employers use an agent to purchase their 
health insurance. NFIB RESEARCH FOUND., supra note 43, at 6 n.9. 
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employers lack expertise or human resources staff to deal with fringe 
benefits issues, and so brokers often serve this function on an outsourced 
basis, paid by commissions. An employer representative noted that, even 
using the Connector’s streamlined website presentation, there are still too 
many choices for employers to feel that the Connector has “taken the 
guesswork out of the decision.” Brokers also emphasize that, in addition to 
complexity, evaluating health insurance is more than simply a 
“spreadsheeting function;” it also is worrisome because making a wrong 
decision could jeopardize someone’s health or life, including the owner’s. 
“You’re not buying a car or furniture. It’s called ’your health’,” which is why, 
brokers stressed, that even sophisticated business owners prefer to rely on 
the expert judgment of a broker they know personally. 
The Connector throughout has sought to include brokers, but brokers 
had reasons to be wary of what they viewed as a “Trojan Horse” or “camel’s 
nose under the tent,” trying to “put us out of business.” If the Connector 
were to succeed, they feared the eventual result would be to 
“disintermediate” brokers — if not by excluding them outright, then by 
charging employers extra for using them. To compound these fears of being 
“thrown under the bus,” Connector officials initially were not perceived as 
being “particularly broker friendly.” Until this year, the Connector did not 
have a broker on the governing board,66 and other board members and key 
Connector personnel were thought to be dismissive of the role or value of 
brokers. Even under a more charitable view, the initial leadership had 
“good people with good intentions, but they just didn't come over that well 
with the [broker] community.” 
A second reason for broker resistance is that the Connector initially paid 
them a significantly lower commission than brokers receive in the regular 
commercial market. The Connector determined that it could afford only 
2.5%, compared with the 3.5% – 4.5% range previously paid in the 
commercial market.67 In the past year or so, however, insurers have reduced 
their prevailing commission rates, to a level similar to the Connector’s, in 
response to pressure on their profit margins from increased governmental 
scrutiny of their premium rates. And, in one respect the Connector pays 
more: it pays a commission ($10 a month) for sole proprietors. Although 
that isn’t much, some brokers view $10 as “better than nothing,” enough to 
“make a meager living.” 
 
 66. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 288 § 42 (2010) (requiring one member of the Board 
to be a member of the Massachusetts chapter of the National Association of Health 
Underwriters). 
 67. Archambault, supra note 49, at 4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
382 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:355 
Thus, on balance most brokers interviewed felt that the Connector’s 
commissions are now roughly equivalent to those in the outside market.68 
But, originally this was not the case. Moreover, many brokers felt that, even 
with similar commissions, there is no especially strong reason for them to 
use the Connector. With equivalent premiums and fewer options, broker 
after broker said something to the effect that “the Connector can’t give 
[brokers] a single solid reason to do business with them” rather than dealing 
with insurers directly. Accordingly, most brokers interviewed have never 
written a single piece of business with the Connector — including several 
who are on its board of advisors. 
The only possibility for greater broker enthusiasm that was mentioned 
was that younger and less well-established brokers might embrace the 
Connector’s unique features (including its wellness tax credit) as a good 
“calling card” to use in soliciting new business. One such broker who had 
placed business with the Connector thought that it has good ideas about 
how to structure choices for small employers, ones that only need “a bit of 
tweaking.” But, other observers noted that the health insurance agency 
business is contracting and so few new people are entering it. 
Despite generally dismissive attitudes, brokers claimed that they do not 
steer clients away from the Connector or avoid it at all costs. Instead, they 
see their role as offering employers the best value available, regardless of 
what makes them the most money. It is possible to take self-serving 
assertions with a certain grain of salt, and some brokers volunteered that not 
all of their colleagues are as open-minded as they themselves were 
professing. Nevertheless, most brokers interviewed appeared genuinely 
open to hearing what the Connector had to offer and seemed sincere in 
their explanation that they had taken a close look on behalf of clients and 
would be willing to recommend the Connector if it offered a superior 
value.69 Many brokers also praised the Connector’s current administration 
 
 68. Some agents insisted this is not the case, but most were agents who have not placed 
business with the Connector. A few others who have noted that the nominal commission is 
similar in and out of the Connector, but the Connector does not pay the bonuses that insurers 
award outside the Connector, for a greater volume of business. Finally, one agent noted that 
the Connector fails to pay any “override” commission to “general agents,” who function as 
intermediaries or conduits between insurers and rank-and-file agents. 
 69. For instance, following the interview with one small group agent who seemed to like 
what the Connector stood for and had previously concluded that it did not offer better value, 
wrote to say the following: “After our meeting we decided to take a hard look at establishing a 
stronger relationship with the Connector to see if it brought any value to the small group 
market and our clients. Unfortunately it does not. Rates are generally higher or the same and 
plan designs are more limited than what employers can get through the existing small group 
marketplace. While they will pay more commission to brokers, we believe it would be a 
disservice to put clients there due to the limitations and some potential service issues.” 
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and leadership for reaching out to their community in constructive ways, and 
were grateful that the Connector had recently added a broker to its Board of 
Directors. And one leader in the broker community praised the Connector 
for its “good job of consumer advocacy, fighting hard for clients.” 
All that said, “nine out of ten” brokers, by one account, still do not like 
the Connector, and those interviewed gave a long list of reasons, rehearsed 
above, why it does not offer better value than the regular market. In 
addition, brokers resented the feeling that they “got stuck with" a lot of "non-
revenue producing activity" required by the reform law in general, which the 
Connector is charged with enforcing (apart from its role as an insurance 
exchange).70 
Some brokers interviewed were openly hostile to the Connector. As 
justification, they cited a letter that the Connector’s original director wrote to 
all 170,000 small employers in the state, announcing the opening of the 
revised small-group "Business Express" program, in early 2010. The letter 
referenced the reduction of fees (described above) for groups of five and 
under and the availability of lower cost options (described above) that are 
based on more limited networks not widely available in the regular 
commercial insurance market. It closed by encouraging employers to “call 
your broker or go direct to [the Connector’s website] and enroll on-line.” 
According to multiple sources, this letter “hit a raw nerve” that made 
brokers “furious.” The broker community was vehement that it was unfair for 
“big government” to use its resources to conduct such a large mailing in 
what they felt was a blatant attempt to “undercut” their existing clients in a 
manner that “wasn’t telling the exact truth.” “It became an emotional thing, 
[the feeling that] you’re out there to kill me.” Two years later, the letter still 
“stuck in the craw” of some brokers who “just won’t forget,” such that, even 
at the time of these interviews, Connector officials were starting broker 
training sessions with an apology about past “mistakes.” 
4. Connector's Mission 
Emotions aside, brokers level-headed and hot-headed alike, along with 
insurers, articulated one overarching theme: that there is no justification for 
 
 70. The reform law requires employers to provide workers a tax-sheltered means to make 
their premium contributions or individual insurance purchases (known as “section 125 plans”) 
and to file an annual report about meeting their employer responsibility requirements under 
the law. Small employers often turn to their insurance agents to help with these Connector-
enforced requirements, so that agents “felt like [they were] giving the Connector a lot of free 
service” to help implement the law. Section 125 Plans – Rules and Regulations, HEALTH 
CONNECTOR, https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector/menuitem.50596a4 
574af0ace505da95c0ce08041/ (follow “Section 125 Plan” under “Employers with 11 or 
more full-time equivalent employees”) (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
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the government to expend substantial resources on the small group market 
in a “disruptive” manner that does not significantly lower prices or improve 
product options. According to various industry sources, the Connector 
“spent a million dollar marketing budget,” “to compete with brokers,” “for 
something that’s already in the marketplace,” “just because the Governor 
said we had to do something.” On balance, its employer programs were 
“much ado about nothing,” “a lot of smoke and mirrors to duplicate what 
we already have.” But the “law says we shall, so we shall.” 
These sellers acknowledge the need for the Connector to arrange 
subsidized coverage for the uninsured, and to structure unsubsidized private 
insurance for individuals.71 But, with 98% of the state's residents insured,72 
they feel there is little additional ground to be gained in seeking enrollees 
from uninsured employers. Therefore, brokers believe that any aggressive 
attempts to increase small group enrollment necessarily will threaten to take 
away their existing business but will not significantly advance legitimate 
health policy objectives. And, insurers wondered “what the point of all of 
this” time and effort has been, for something that has “turned out to be a 
nonevent.” Even some Connector officials and Board members (former and 
current) wonder whether the employer component “was worth all of this 
attention” and did not “border on being a waste of time.” 
The multiple objectives of health reform point to a final institutional 
factor that explains the Connector’s limited success with small groups. 
According to many key observers, and some former Connector officials, it 
properly directed its main attention among its important competing priorities 
at the outset to launching subsidized coverage and other aspects of the new 
reform law. Its second priority was then to make individual coverage 
available in the private unsubsidized market, since that is the market 
segment that most insurers had neglected under the state’s prior community 
rating laws. With the small group market functioning comparatively well on 
its own, the Connector naturally came to it as a third priority. Therefore, the 
Connector did not implement a small group program until its third year, and 
even then the program was not marketed since it was still being piloted (for 
reasons explained above). 
Marketing to small groups began in earnest in early 2010, when the 
small group program was reformed into Business Express, but that 
marketing included the explosive letter described above. Unluckily still, this 
letter was soon followed by the precipitous exodus of all the market’s 
 
 71. Because of its prior community rating and guaranteed issue laws, Massachusetts 
insurers have not paid any commissions for individual (nongroup) coverage, which has made 
it more difficult for individuals to find insurance. Now, half of this market segment purchases 
its coverage through the Connector. 
 72. Facts and Figures, supra note 15. 
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leading insurers, sparked by the Governor’s rate freeze.73 Without these 
“brand name” insurers, the Connector largely suspended its employer 
marketing efforts until early 2012, when the leading insurers rejoined. 
Therefore, a full-throated presentation of the Connector’s small group 
program has only recently begun. And even now, the Connector is cautious 
to avoid direct marketing in a way that might backfire with brokers, as it did 
before. 
On balance, then, it may well be too early to declare the Connector's 
employer programs a “complete flop” “that went absolutely nowhere” (as 
two brokers said). Indeed, several informed sources thought that perhaps 
the Connector’s approach to offering individual employee choice that 
included more limited networks was just “a few years ahead of the market,” 
and Connector officials stressed that its full-scale small-group program had 
been operating for only a few months at the time of this study. 
III.  APPLICABILITY TO OTHER STATES 
How relevant are these experiences for other states implementing the 
ACA's SHOP Exchange? Despite obvious differences, interviewees 
consistently thought that the experiences in Massachusetts are relevant 
beyond its particular reform law and market conditions. One way to reflect 
this generalizeability is to note the various lessons that these informed 
market participants, observers, and regulators thought could be learned by 
others from the Massachusetts experience. Each of the following pieces of 
advice was shared by stakeholders from several different perspectives: 
 Focus on the value proposition that an exchange structure has to offer 
the small group market. Do not simply attempt to replicate the existing 
market, but consider what its problems and limitations are, and which 
ones a SHOP exchange realistically can address. And then focus the 
SHOP exchange on making those improvements rather than 
attempting to serve multiple purposes and all market components. 
 Don’t aim for overnight perfection. Building an effective exchange for 
small employers is complicated and should be done in a step-wise 
manner that avoids being too complex or overly engineered. 
 Use existing expertise in the market and build on technology platforms 
that insurers and brokers are already comfortable with rather than 
attempting to build everything from scratch. 
 
 73. Archambault, supra note 49, at 6. 
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 Don’t underestimate the influence of brokers and their importance as 
advisors to employers and their knowledge base in contributing to the 
successful design and operation of an exchange. 
 Don’t underestimate the difficulties in reaching consensus with and 
among competing insurers and in formulating effective operating rules 
in a way that preserves broad participation and a level playing field. 
Although these lessons learned from Massachusetts appear to be 
broadly applicable to other states under the ACA, there are several factors 
that might improve or hamper the particular performance of small group 
exchange structures in other states, compared to the Massachusetts 
experience. First, other states may have a greater need for an employer-
based exchange structure than did Massachusetts, owing to the fact that 
other states may not have intermediaries already in place that provide some 
online shopping features for comparing prices and benefits. Also, 
Massachusetts previously had eliminated medical underwriting, and its 
employer market was dominated prior to reform by a handful of HMOs with 
similar networks and benefits. Several people felt that these features gave 
Massachusetts a fairly standardized set of prices and benefits even before 
the Connector entered the picture, which might not be the case in states with 
a broader range of plan types, benefit structures, and underwriting 
practices. If so, other states might have a greater need to simplify the 
shopping experience. Two people, however, thought that because of the 
presence in Massachusetts of some limited network plans, it may have more 
network diversity, and therefore more to gain from a structured 
clearinghouse, than other states. 
Other important differences were noted between the ACA’s provisions 
and the Massachusetts reform law. Most significant is the ACA’s use of a risk 
adjustment mechanism to address adverse selection problems among 
competing insurers.74 Massachusetts lacked this feature, and its small group 
exchange was hampered by insurers’ concerns over adverse selection. 
However, a number of interviewees commented that risk adjustment would 
not fully address insurers’ selection concerns because risk adjustment is 
imperfect, and they felt most insurers tend to be “paranoid” that they will be 
selected against in an exchange setting more than their competitors. 
Another important difference in the ACA is its payment of substantial 
subsidies to individuals purchasing through exchanges, in contrast to 
Massachusetts where individual private insurance is unsubsidized. The 
ACA’s subsidies are expected to bring many more previously uninsured 
 
 74. See generally MARK A. HALL, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, RISK ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: A GUIDE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS (2011). 
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people to the exchanges,75 which should give them leverage, if they wish to 
use it, to insist on willing participation in the employer component in order 
to qualify for participation in the subsidized nongroup component. The 
Massachusetts Connector also made full participation a formal requirement 
for insurers selling to individuals, but various sources explained that the 
Connector never felt it had, and so never attempted to use, enough 
leverage to force participation in the employer component.76 
Finally, several people commented that, to some extent, the Connector 
was “ahead of its time,” and so features that initially failed might well 
succeed if tried again, or tried elsewhere. In particular, under the ACA the 
individual choice aspect of the Connector’s initial employer program would 
not need to be done on a pilot basis, since the ACA mandates offering 
employers at least the option of providing a worker-choice model. Without 
the limitations of a pilot program, the employer component would 
presumably be open to all brokers, and thus could be broadly advertised — 
overcoming some of the Connector’s initial obstacles. Moreover, the ACA’s 
provision for funding navigators within exchanges conceivably could help to 
address some of the concerns brokers expressed about the lack of support 
for taking on the extra burdens of explaining more complex choice features 
to employers and workers. 
On balance, the Massachusetts Connector’s difficulties in establishing a 
successful employer exchange amply illustrate the challenges that other 
states will likely face in establishing SHOP exchanges under the ACA. States 
need to walk the fine and sometimes faint line between creating a market 
structure that improves on what already exists in a small-group market 
segment that typically functions reasonably well already — and to do so in a 
way that is not unduly threatening to existing market participants. As many 
informed sources commented, that is a tall order. But, if it is to be filled, the 
experiences in Massachusetts are a good guide for which strategies have 
some potential, and which are likely to fail or flounder. 
  
 
 75. See FAMILIES USA, LOWER TAXES, LOWER PREMIUMS: THE NEW HEALTH INSURANCE TAX 
CREDIT 1 (2010), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/health-reform/Premium-
Tax-Credits.pdf. 
 76. The Connector’s subsidized coverage is provided by a different set of Medicaid-based 
health plans, which do not include the leading private insurers. 
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